In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.N.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.N.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0168
FILED 04-29-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS22113
The Honorable Pamela S. Gates, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Gillespie, Shields & Taylor, Mesa
By Mark A. Shields, Robert O. Newell
Counsel for Appellee Father
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.N.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Melissa O. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her son S.N. For the following reasons,
we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Tyler N. (“Father”), who were never married, are
the parents of S.N., born in 2010. After Father and Mother’s relationship
deteriorated, they entered into a partial agreement for custody and
parenting time in August 2012. Over the next few months, Mother had
supervised visits with S.N. about once a week. In January 2013, the family
court entered an order, based on the parents’ stipulation, addressing
custody, parenting time, and child support (“2013 Order”). The joint
custody and parenting time provisions would “only take effect upon
[Mother’s] presentment of six consecutive, on-schedule negative and
undiluted drug tests.” If Mother completed “six consecutive clean, timely
and undiluted drug tests,” she and Father would exercise “joint legal
custody” over S.N. Mother was ordered to pay Father a reduced child
support amount of $50 per month.

¶3 Mother never completed the requisite drug tests. According
to Mother, transportation concerns and her mental health struggles resulted
in the completion of only two tests, both of which she failed. Mother’s last
contact with S.N. was in 2012, and she never paid child support. Mother
did not seek to modify the 2013 Order or otherwise attempt to exercise her
parental rights in family court.

¶4 Father began living with his girlfriend (“Jessica”) in 2012, and
the two married in 2014. In 2024, Jessica told Mother she wanted to adopt
S.N. and asked Mother to relinquish her parental rights voluntarily. After
Mother refused, Father petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental rights
based on abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1); -533(B)(1).

¶5 At the subsequent termination adjudication hearing, Mother
testified that throughout their relationship, Father was verbally and

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physically abusive. S.N.’s maternal grandmother also testified that she
witnessed abusive behavior from Father, and that he had threatened
Mother; S.N.’s maternal aunt corroborated Mother’s claim that Father was
verbally abusive. S.N.’s paternal grandmother testified that in September
2023, either S.N. or his half-sister had said that Father had choked and
kicked S.N. The paternal grandmother also said there was an incident in
October 2023 where S.N. ran away from home, came to her house, and said
he was “always” terrified of Father. During Father’s testimony, he denied
physically or emotionally abusing Mother or S.N. and noted that a DCS
investigation found the allegations made in September 2023 were
unsubstantiated. Jessica likewise denied witnessing Father acting
abusively toward S.N.

¶6 Mother testified that she tried contacting Father several times
to contact S.N. but failed. She described an attempt in 2015 where one of
her relatives tried to contact Father, who told the relative that Mother and
her family would never see S.N. again. Mother also explained that she
requested to speak with S.N. when Jessica contacted her in 2023, but the
request was denied. Father and Jessica denied such attempts at contact.

¶7 Polly Thomas, a licensed clinical social worker, testified about
the social study she prepared, which was admitted into evidence. Thomas
testified that she had interviewed S.N. and determined he was safe in
Father’s home. She also testified that (1) Jessica was “instrumental in
establishing a safe and caring home environment,” (2) she has been
involved in S.N.’s education and community participation, and (3) S.N.
wanted her to adopt him.

¶8 The juvenile court determined Father proved that Mother
abandoned S.N. by clear and convincing evidence “as defined by Arizona
law.” The court acknowledged Mother’s personal challenges but explained
it was obligated under the law “to evaluate a parent’s actions to assess
whether the parent failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with a
child without just cause.” The court found there was no just cause for
Mother’s failure to “maintain any relationship with [S.N.] for the last ten
years,” explaining that after she failed to complete the necessary drug tests,
Mother did not attempt to modify parenting time orders, provide her son
with financial support, or send cards, gifts, or letters. The court also found
that termination was in S.N.’s best interests, explaining that S.N. wants to
be adopted by Jessica and that adoption would give him “permanency and
a sense of security.” The court terminated Mother’s parental rights. Mother
timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

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DISCUSSION

¶9 Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding that Mother
abandoned S.N., and that termination was in his best interests. In
reviewing an order terminating parental rights, we accept the court’s
factual findings if reasonable evidence supports them. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 (2023). We will affirm the court’s legal
conclusions—that one statutory ground for termination under A.R.S.
§ 8-533 has been proven by clear and convincing evidence—unless those
conclusions are clearly erroneous. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. 478–79, ¶ 31.

A. Abandonment

¶10 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), the juvenile court may terminate
parental rights if the parent has abandoned the child. Abandonment is
defined as “the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to
maintain regular contact with the child, including providing normal
supervision.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The “[f]ailure to maintain a normal
parental relationship with the child without just cause for a period of six
months constitutes prima facie evidence of abandonment.” Id. (emphasis
added).

¶11 Mother argues the court committed legal error by finding that
Mother did not have “just cause” for failing to maintain a normal parental
relationship with S.N. She contends the “just cause” language in A.R.S.
§ 8-531(1) “necessarily injects a subjective element” into an abandonment
analysis, and that as a result, the court erred by not considering Mother’s
fears about Father before terminating her parental rights. According to
Mother, there was “overwhelming evidence that demonstrated Father was
emotionally and physically abusive” during his and Mother’s relationship
and that her failure to maintain a relationship with S.N. was based on her
“paralyzing fear of Father.” Thus, Mother argues the court’s failure to
consider Father’s conduct and its effect on her constitutes reversible error.

¶12 We reject Mother’s assertion that A.R.S. § 8-531(1) requires
courts to consider the subjective reasons for a parent’s failure to maintain a
normal parental relationship. Our supreme court has confirmed that
“abandonment is measured not by a parent’s subjective intent, but by the
parent’s conduct: the statute asks whether a parent has provided reasonable
support, maintained regular contact, made more than minimal efforts to
support and communicate with the child, and maintained a normal
parental relationship.” Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246,
249–50, ¶ 18 (2000). Thus, whether the court erred in finding that Mother

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had abandoned S.N. turns on what Mother did or failed to do, rather than
her reasons for such actions or inactions.

¶13 Mother acknowledged she had not seen or communicated
with S.N. since 2012. She admitted that she did not complete the drug tests
or pay child support required under the 2013 Order and never sought
modification of that order. Likewise, Mother did not show she consistently
sought contact with S.N. as the years went on; her testimony reflected that
she asked Father once in 2015 to have contact with S.N., and that she asked
to speak with S.N. after Jessica contacted her to discuss the termination
petition. When circumstances prevent a parent from “exercising traditional
methods of bonding with [her] child, [she] must act persistently to establish
the relationship however possible and must vigorously assert [her] legal
rights to the extent necessary.” Id. at 250, ¶ 22. Mother’s claimed attempts
to communicate with S.N. in several instances over more than a decade do
not support a finding that she acted persistently to maintain her parental
relationship with S.N. Even assuming the truth of Mother’s testimony, as
well as the other evidence she offered about Father’s abusive behavior, the
court did not err in concluding she abandoned S.N.

B. Best Interests

¶14 Mother argues the juvenile court erred by concluding that
termination would be in S.N.’s best interests. She contends the court failed
to consider the totality of the circumstances, referencing Father’s and
Jessica’s abusive or violent conduct, and that the weight of this evidence
made it unreasonable to conclude that termination would be in S.N.’s best
interests.

¶15 The party seeking termination must establish that termination
is in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Kent K.
v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). Termination of the parental
relationship is in a child’s best interests if continuing the parental
relationship would harm the child or if the child would benefit from
termination. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 16 (2016). “Courts
must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the
severance determination” in deciding whether termination is in the child’s
best interests. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150–51, ¶ 13
(2018).

¶16 The record does not support Mother’s assertion that the court
disregarded the evidence she describes. In its termination order, the court
acknowledged it “heard testimony to suggest that adoption would not be

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in [S.N.’s] best interest[s] or that termination would be detrimental to
[S.N.],” but that it did not agree with such testimony and heard no credible
testimony to the contrary. Instead, the court found that S.N. would benefit
from a formalized relationship between S.N. and Jessica, providing the
child with permanency.

¶17 As to whether the weight of the evidence proved that
termination was in S.N.’s best interests, the resolution of conflicting
evidence is “uniquely the province of the juvenile court,” and on appeal,
we will not re-weigh the evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses.
Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 12 (App. 2002).
Though Mother and other witnesses testified that Father acted violently
toward S.N. and Mother, Father denied such allegations. Moreover, the
court heard testimony that S.N. was safe in the home, had a positive
relationship with Jessica, and wanted to be adopted. The weight assigned
to this evidence versus the allegations of abuse from other witnesses was
within the court’s discretion. Because reasonable evidence supports the
court’s conclusions, Mother has not shown the court erred.

CONCLUSION

¶18 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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